

## Durham Research Online

---

### Deposited in DRO:

20 April 2017

### Version of attached file:

Accepted Version

### Peer-review status of attached file:

Peer-reviewed

### Citation for published item:

Craig, David (2013) 'Statesmanship.', in Languages of politics in nineteenth-century Britain. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 44-68.

### Further information on publisher's website:

[https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137312891\\_3](https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137312891_3)

### Publisher's copyright statement:

Craig, David, Statesmanship, 2013, Palgrave Macmillan UK reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. This extract is taken from the author's original manuscript and has not been edited. The definitive, published, version of record is available here: [https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137312891\\_3](https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137312891_3).

### Additional information:

---

## Use policy

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a [link](#) is made to the metadata record in DRO
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the [full DRO policy](#) for further details.

## Statesmanship

David Craig

In 1921 James Bryce observed in *Modern Democracies* how ‘extremely small is the number of persons by whom the world is governed’ and that free government was always ‘an Oligarchy within a Democracy’.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, a major theme in the historiography of Britain has been whether ‘modernisation’ was helped or hindered by its largely aristocratic elite, and how that elite adapted itself to the process.<sup>2</sup> This concern has led in two directions: assessments of the economic and political power of the elite, and studies of how far political decisions were impervious to democratic pressure. The latter trend has, in recent years, turned its attention to the role of ‘ideals’ and ‘values’ in the behaviour of politicians.<sup>3</sup> There are now important works examining, for instance, the way that leaders tried to mobilise and manipulate wider bodies of opinion; the heroic or tragic narratives of national history in which they located their political personas; and the deeper – sometimes anxious – gendered assumptions about the status of ‘public men’.<sup>4</sup> What, generally, has not been explored was how leadership itself was understood at the time.<sup>5</sup> A political leader existed within a network of assumptions of what leadership was – these could be resources to draw upon, but they were also constraints which constituted an ideal and a form of evaluation. This chapter considers five aspects of statesmanship, beginning with its relationship to governance. It then explores the essential requirements of statesmen, that they possess both principles and judgment. The final section examines the important role of character, and also the necessity of communication skills – pre-eminently oratory. These were the elements of statesmanship: as Bryce argued, since the people themselves did not rule, ‘a nation is tested and judged by the quality of those it chooses and supports as its leaders; and by their capacity it stands or falls’.<sup>6</sup>

## Definitions

It may be useful to begin with terminology. While the word ‘statesman’ had an ancestry going back to the sixteenth century, ‘statesmanship’ was a recent coinage which appeared with increasing frequency from the 1830s and enjoyed its heyday between the 1880s and 1930s, before steeply declining thereafter.<sup>7</sup> The word referred to political leadership and the qualities by which it was marked. It was also a strongly idealised concept, as is apparent from the reaction to one of the few guides that explicitly addressed its scope and functions. First published in 1836, Henry Taylor’s *The Statesman* argued that most writers on government were concerned with ‘the structure of communities and the nature of political powers and institutions’ and had little to say about the ‘art of *exercising* political functions’ unless – like Machiavelli, Bacon and Burke – they had themselves direct political experience.<sup>8</sup> The reception of the work was telling. While it was agreed that there was a real need for a work which delineated the ideal of a statesman, Taylor’s book was not it. One reviewer thought it should have been called *The Minister* rather than *The Statesman*, and ‘of the wide distinction which may exist between these terms, the world has had frequent and melancholy proof’.<sup>9</sup> The problem was that Taylor seemed more concerned with advising a politician how to get and keep office – ‘the arts of rising’ – than with teaching him the performance of his duty.<sup>10</sup> Such a man was ‘destitute of all principle’ except the ‘love of place and power’, and, inevitably, this led to Taylor being charged with Machiavellianism.<sup>11</sup> While this was not a fair account of the work, it does show that, first, anxiety about unmerited privilege remained strong in the 1830s, and second, that the concept of ‘statesman’ was widely conceived in idealised terms that required it to be distinguished from the mundane ambition and pragmatism of ordinary politicians.

In addition, there was also a revealing tension between the ‘statesman-as-hero’ and the ‘statesman-as-common man’. This can best be seen by comparing Carlyle and Bagehot. Carlyle wanted a hero who could transcend the limits of his time and to whom ‘our wills are to be subordinated’. Such a man was the key to ‘perfect government’ and ‘no ballot-box, parliamentary eloquence, voting, constitution-building, or other machinery whatsoever can improve it a whit’.<sup>12</sup> To some degree this chimed with the mood of crisis in the early 1840s – both Gladstone and Disraeli, in differing ways, can be found hankering for a deeper sense of leadership and government.<sup>13</sup> Yet by 1850, when the *Latter-Day Pamphlets* were published, it seemed out-of-place. This tirade against parliamentary government insisted it was foolish to expect ‘heroic wisdom’ in parliamentarians, and that the best hope was a statesman who could ‘shape the dim tendencies of Parliament, and guide them wisely to the goal’.<sup>14</sup> The fact that Carlyle believed Peel was such a man should not disguise how idiosyncratic the position had become. A safer guide is Bagehot, not least because he understood that statesmen had to work within the constraints of parliamentary government. In the mid 1850s he noted the persistent calls for a ‘great statesman’ to replace the Aberdeen coalition, but argued that while men like Alexander and Napoleon might suit nations with an ‘imperial disposition’ they would be out of place in Britain except at times of genuine emergency.<sup>15</sup> What was needed were statesmen in tune with the ordinary man on the omnibus and who understood the nature of parliamentary government. Carlyle might hate the ‘jangling, talking, and arguing’ of Parliament, but these were in fact its lifeblood: ‘a dictator will not save us – we require discussion, explanation, controversy’.<sup>16</sup> When Disraeli lambasted a previous generation as ‘arch mediocrities’, Bagehot thought it something of a compliment.<sup>17</sup>

We must look to the various commentaries on leading politicians in order to tease out the assumptions that underlay the language of statesmanship. It was widely thought that biography was a peculiarly instructive literary form, a belief that culminated in the *Dictionary*

*of National Biography* at the end of the century. Samuel Smiles's popular oeuvre of works almost entirely depended on biographical portraits of worthies, and even J. R. Seeley conceded that while the 'real subject' of history was the state, not the individual, nevertheless 'useful knowledge' was best diffused to the wider populace through biographies of famous men.<sup>18</sup> Various series such as 'Twelve English Statesman' and 'The Queen's Prime Ministers' were only the tip of an enormous iceberg of sketches, portraits, essays, obituaries and biographies which took interest in the 'characters of public men'.<sup>19</sup> For the purposes of this essay, it does not matter whether these works succumbed to hagiography, nor whether their judgments of political successes and failures were accurate – indeed, it is striking how quickly reputations were born which have subsequently taken considerable historical effort to dislodge.<sup>20</sup> The aim here is not to judge statesmen but rather to illuminate the terms by which they were judged, and the ideals to which they ought to have aspired.

## Governance

The nineteenth century saw a dramatic growth in government: the range of responsibility and complexity of business of the state grew with increasing rapidity, and placed pressures on a creaking bureaucracy and its departmental heads. Inevitably this meant more attention was focused on the duties of statesmanship. In the main, to be a statesman required effective holding of office. The definition of the term could slip: supporters of Fox always claimed he was a statesman, though others wondered whether he had ever really proven himself as a leader in office. Melbourne was commonly judged to have had 'little aptitude for public business' and hence, some concluded, could not be esteemed a great statesman. Lord Aberdeen, similarly, was blamed for an 'administrative incapacity' that impaired his reputation.<sup>21</sup> Bright represents an important case: a first-rate orator, and, by his death,

recognised as a powerful politician, it was still agreed that he was an inferior administrator whose brief tenures in office were largely unsuccessful. Hence, as *The Standard* put it, he was not ‘and did not profess to be, a great Statesman’. Such a person had to have ‘the power of governing, of conducting administrative and legislative affairs, and of getting people to act under him, and with him’.<sup>22</sup> These abilities were central to the statesman. Doubts, for instance, were expressed about Disraeli. Bagehot commented that he would himself ‘smile’ to have been called a successful administrator, and his majority government seemed to show he had no real sense of what to do with power. That part of his mind intended for business and detail – ‘the solid part’ – was under-developed.<sup>23</sup> Even otherwise eulogistic obituaries conceded this point, and Froude, one of his biographers, concluded that few of his measures had lasted, and in that respect he could not claim to be a great statesman.<sup>24</sup>

The poor quality of statesmanship was a recurring theme in the first half of the century which the arrival of Reform – and with it aristocratic Whiggery – did not entirely address. As the scope of the state increased there was mounting suspicion that the traditional elite was not up to the task. If in the 1770s Burke’s linking of good government with aristocratic families seemed plausible, by the 1830s it was under challenge: Reform might have prevented executive dominance of Parliament, but it did not seem to have eradicated aristocratic patronage or infused government with a more vigorous sense of its potential.<sup>25</sup> These concerns – waxing and waning, but never disappearing – continued into the 1850s, and came to a head during the Crimean crisis.<sup>26</sup> Ironically, it was the Whig governments that particularly attracted criticism, whether it was Melbourne’s indolence in the 30s or Russell’s exclusiveness in the 40s and early 50s. The idea that government remained a nest of incompetence – and an aristocratic racket besides – was close to the heart of various forms of middle-class reformism in the 1850s.

Broadly speaking, there were two connected lines of criticism. The first was the radical argument that, while the aristocracy had a ‘paralyzing grasp’ over statesmanship, it had shown time and again that it was not up to the task. The reforms of the 1830s had only gone a little way to addressing the problem.<sup>27</sup> Although radicals continued to press this point in the 1840s and 50s, they were not alone in raising question marks over the adequacy of the aristocracy. Bagehot, for instance, made the interesting argument that in reality the ‘heavy lifting’ had for a long time *not* been performed by the landed elite: they ‘will rarely do the work, and can rarely do the work’. The daily grind of government was ‘too much for refined habits, delicate administration, anxious judgment’ which their style of life nurtured.<sup>28</sup> One solution – for instance in Taylor’s *Statesman* – was to give more attention to the training of rising politicians. They should be settled in office as early as possible, in order to acquire a ‘capacity for taking decisions’, and to learn that drudgery was essential to teach patience and application.<sup>29</sup> In this, at least, the *Westminster Review* agreed, thinking an improvement in the ‘character’ and ‘abilities’ of politicians a start, to which should be added knowledge of political economy and moral philosophy.<sup>30</sup> More generally it was argued that there needed to be more middle-class men in Parliament, and radicals sought various measure of administrative and constitutional reform to that end.

This led into the second line of criticism which focused less on character and class than on the inherited structures of government. Taylor thought that there was something ‘fatally amiss in the very idea of statesmanship’ because constant parliamentary pressure on ministerial activity undermined incentives to implement constructive reform: it was invariably more trouble than it was worth. His solution was to increase the number of permanent under-secretaries in a department, and transfer to them as much routine business as possible, and so freeing the parliamentary heads to become ‘efficient statesmen’.<sup>31</sup> Nearly two decades later W. R. Greg – a leading member of the industrial elite in Manchester –

reflected on the apparently poor ‘Prospects of British Statesmanship’. While it was customary to blame this on the exclusivity of the aristocracy, he doubted whether simply increasing the number of middle-class men in Parliament would be effective, because too few of them really had the skills requisite of a statesman. The problem ultimately lay in the way that Parliament had evolved. As it ceased to be a body designed to represent grievances and defend liberties, so it had less need of ‘orators and legislators’. Instead it needed ‘capable administrators’ who could counteract its ‘tedious, ponderous, and inefficient’ tendencies.<sup>32</sup> One solution was to enable the sovereign to choose ministers from any rank and profession of life: they would have parliamentary seats but not votes. In effect administration would be revived by circumventing parliamentary government. Greg also adapted Taylor’s proposals about bureaucratic reform, and argued for more active departmental committees to consider plans and to advise ministers.

While such criticisms seemed fraught during times of crisis, they tended to recede once the panic had passed. Palmerston’s confident charm seemed to beguile the nation over the next ten years. In any case, some commentators argued that the lineaments of a solution could be seen in the statesmanship of Peel. Despite – as we shall see – intense criticism of his career as a whole, it was widely agreed that he was an exemplary administrator. If he lacked the ‘grandeur of the patriot-hero’ he more than made up for it by being a man of business.<sup>33</sup> This was the nub of Bagehot’s argument as well. Since the late eighteenth century the landed elite realised it was temperamentally ill-suited to administration and came to rely on ‘men of a somewhat lower grade’ whose ambition and aptitude suited them to government, but who were still sufficiently gentlemanly not to offend that elite. As the middle classes grew in strength and demanded government in accordance with notions they were familiar with, they found in Peel the ‘plain sense’ they required. Hence he switched from being the ‘the nominee of a nobility’ to the ‘representative of a transacting and trading multitude’.<sup>34</sup> In a different



way even Palmerston seemed to show that aristocrats were capable of leadership. If in private some politicians had their doubts ('not a good man for general business'), by the time of his death he was being depicted as an 'energetic statesman' who had a 'business-like' talent for administration without the pedantry.<sup>35</sup> Whether or not these claims convinced, it is striking that they could be applied to Palmerston without incurring ridicule, and that the 'business-faculty' could be found in an aristocratic dandy.

The second half of the century saw a shift of anxiety. Bagehot signalled this in various criticisms of administrative reformers. While he agreed that business-men had a greater capacity for 'action and work' than most country gentlemen, therein lay a problem: they often lacked the breadth of judgment to know when to act and when not to act. Accustomed to directing affairs for themselves, they disliked sharing power with a permanent official, and could not see that their job was largely one of co-ordinating the office. In parliamentary government 'excessive action is almost as great an evil as gross incompetence', and there was something, therefore, to be said for 'aristocratic *laissez-aller*'.<sup>36</sup> This theme is illuminated clearly by a comparison between Gladstone and Salisbury. The former, it was agreed, had an enormous capacity for administration: he could combine the largest of principles with the trickiest of details, and deftly oversee a torrent of legislation.<sup>37</sup> Yet he was often seen as 'unsafe'.<sup>38</sup> By the early 1870s some judged him incapable of 'calm and moderation', and various writers put this down to his business background – he was 'interested too much' in everything that came across his path.<sup>39</sup> Unsurprisingly this unease matured in the following decade, and later assessments frequently noted that his 'boundless energy' could sometimes over-ripen into autocratic will.<sup>40</sup> Salisbury's style was very different. He lacked the visionary ideals of his opponent, and deliberately buried himself at the Foreign Office in order to detach himself from popular enthusiasms. Yet 'he possessed that capacity for government and guidance which is ... the most indispensable quality in a statesman'. Indeed his skill was

in calming and controlling the very passions his antagonist had unleashed. *The Times* concluded that he exemplified aristocratic virtues and that ‘in the aristocracy and gentry of England are preserved incomparable resources for the guidance and government of the nation. The more democratic a Constitution becomes, the more essential to it are leadership and guidance, authority and control’.<sup>41</sup> The reputation of aristocrats as statesmen had not come full circle, but it is notable that the arrival of populism and democracy provided the space in which aristocratic indifference could be repackaged as statesmanlike detachment.

### Principles and Judgment

The central question, of course, was what statesmen wanted to do with their leadership. Here the ideal of a principled political career in the service of the nation was always being threatened by the suspicion that selfish ends and nefarious means might lay behind a facade. The shadow cast by early modern *raison d'état* was a very long one, and the statesmanship pioneered by Richelieu and Olivares – with its justification of deceit and cunning – hardly sat easily in an age of religious seriousness. Indeed it was widely thought that the preceding two centuries had manifested fairly low standards of political morality.<sup>42</sup> The question of consistency of principle was therefore a central one which touched on the broader concerns of honesty and hypocrisy in politics.<sup>43</sup> Macaulay argued that for the mass of the populace ‘the test of integrity in a public man is consistency’ and while not a perfect barometer of character, it was a good one.<sup>44</sup> Similarly, Smiles insisted that honesty of purpose needed to be linked to ‘sound principles’ and that a man lacking them was like a ship without compass or rudder. Indeed, he feared that democratic pressures were encouraging politicians to pander to the public and loosen their consciences. All around him he saw ‘diplomacy, expediency, and moral reservation ... equivocation or moral dodging – twisting and so stating the things as to

convey a false impression'.<sup>45</sup> The statesman had to find a way to balance his principles with the flexibility his situation required.

The estimate of statesmen always included some discussion of principle and integrity. Some were particularly commended in this regard: all obituarists commented on Grey's 'boasted consistency' and that he would have sacrificed objects of ambition if they clashed with his principles.<sup>46</sup> Russell, similarly, was viewed as consistent, though there was a danger that he could be 'intolerant as well as unbending'.<sup>47</sup> Conversely, some politicians were presumed to fall short of the ideal. Palmerston was accused of 'indifference to principles' – evident in his switching of parties – and yet this could be explained away in terms of his patriotism.<sup>48</sup> Disraeli was less fortunate, and the charge of being unprincipled never went away – an adventurer 'without fixed principles', he 'never had a political faith'.<sup>49</sup> Trollope did not even accuse him of hypocrisy, because that at least implied there were *some* private beliefs being concealed.<sup>50</sup>

The more complex cases were those where politicians made a point of having principles and yet seemed to change them at particular moments. Peel was perhaps the most notorious case because of his change of stance on both Catholic emancipation in 1829, and Corn Law repeal in 1846. Lengthy discussions tried to prove he was in reality totally devoid of principles, and that his policy was simply whatever was convenient for himself, a man whose 'idol was power'.<sup>51</sup> As Greg noted in Peel's defence, the charge of 'treachery and tergiversation' was always thought damning because inconsistency was presumed fatal to the character of a politician.<sup>52</sup> The supporters of Peel instead made the case that these changes of policy were proof that he served the needs of the nation even at the cost of his own career (though some thought questions of honour to his party were at stake in remaining in office to repeal the Corn Laws).<sup>53</sup> Yet this was not entirely easy to swallow: *The Times* was not alone in suggesting that Peel had inaugurated the 'unpalatable truth' that principle must 'give way

to what he called “expediency”.<sup>54</sup> The question was, expedient for whom – his own ambition, or the whole nation? Similar problems pervaded Gladstone’s career, but he tried to pre-empt critics by explaining his changed positions at some length, for instance in two separate autobiographical publications.<sup>55</sup> It was a common observation that his style of argument was oblique, subtle, tortured. As early as 1859 one perceptive critic argued that on any given question ‘Mr Gladstone’s former self’ was always his strongest adversary and that a career of such ‘instability’ would have led to ridicule had not the intellect been so impressive: a mind ‘so forcible in its faculties’ and yet ‘so facile in conversion’ was worthy of study.<sup>56</sup> Bagehot noted that Gladstone’s temperamental intensity, which attracted him to strong statements of principle, coupled with a scholastic intellect, meant he was forever proliferating arguments and splitting hairs to make the evolution of his positions seem consistent.<sup>57</sup> The point was affirmed in obituaries: the *Daily News* commented on the painful struggles Gladstone went through to avoid the charge of acting from ‘interested motives’. ‘It was not that he was inconsistent; he himself said and believed that a painful consistency had been the characteristic feature of his life.’<sup>58</sup> The danger, as Bryce suggested, was that because he could both respond to critics, and persuade himself of anything, he could to opponents and followers alike, seem dangerously erratic.<sup>59</sup>

Even the highest-minded statesmen struggled to reconcile the expectation of principle with the reality of politics. Some commentators therefore asked their readers to judge whether it was possible for any politician never to have changed their position. Ritchie, responding to the criticism that Disraeli lacked principles, asked ‘Well, what eminent MP has? ... The best statesman in modern times is he who is least hampered by principles, and is free to follow the leading of public opinion.’<sup>60</sup> A point commonly made was that the very structure of parliamentary government made pure consistency, if not impossible, then certainly ineffective. Burke had famously castigated the independent member who preserved his

conscience at the expense of achieving nothing, and instead defended the essential nature of party.<sup>61</sup> A related issue concerned cabinet unity: surely it was impossible to believe that a comparatively large number of men could agree wholeheartedly on any given issue, and so it was inevitable that individuals would need to set aside their personal beliefs from time to time.<sup>62</sup> Taking this idea further, Bagehot argued that office placed so many conflicting demands on politicians that ‘those subject to it have no opinions’ beyond the most general of views. Again and again statesmen had not only to make arguments that they did not think conclusive, but ‘to defend opinions which they do not believe to be true’. Ironically, the need to seem convinced of a policy at one time, and then, at a later time, to embrace its opposite gave the impression of ‘great apparent changes of opinion’.<sup>63</sup> The pressure of cabinet unity therefore created graver problems of inconsistency than were really the case. Greg argued that the reason why this seemed a problem was that in the eighteenth century Parliament had been a forum where politicians contended for mastery and in which changes of party arose from dubious motives, and so inconsistency was seen as a question of personal honour. Since then, however, Parliament had become a body of legislators designed to serve the needs of the nation. Yes, politicians needed to demonstrate a form of constancy – steadiness of purpose, largeness of vision – but not at the cost of flexibility. The very system required that politicians have an ‘open and earnest convincability’.<sup>64</sup>

These structural explanations, however, did not dissolve the ethical anxieties. Taylor contrasted those who thought the virtues of private life must be carried into politics with those who deemed ‘Necessity’ – or expediency – to be justified. His solution was to argue that in terms of beneficial consequences it was better to relax the ‘law of truth’ in politics than to insist on it. Moralists must permit statesmen ‘a free judgment ... though a most responsible one, in the weighing of specific against general evil’.<sup>65</sup> This did not satisfy reviewers. Some thought this little different from Machiavellianism and insisted that private

morality must be the basis for political conduct, while others were puzzled why Taylor seemed to support utilitarianism in public but not private life.<sup>66</sup> A comparison of the ‘Ethics of Statesmanship’, as exemplified by the careers of Peel and Palmerston, also revealed some of these anxieties. Peel’s seeming abandonment of principles led to the charge of expediency, and yet Palmerston’s popularity did not suffer when he boasted that expediency was ‘the one actuating motive of his public policy’. While the author agreed that the private life of a politician was no reflection of his public ability, he could not endorse Buckle’s argument that the business of a statesman was to act ‘not according to his own principles, but according to the wishes of the people’. The conscience should not be over-ridden by the public will, and a statesman who simply took instructions ‘should not call his proceedings statesmanship nor should object if others call them “unprincipled”’.<sup>67</sup> Without a strong faith in expediency, and yet aware that pure consistency was unrealistic, the public was ultimately expected to put its trust in the judgment of politicians.

Although widely seen as a central aspect of successful statesmanship, political judgment was not easy to define. It may be helpful to look first at those politicians thought lacking in this quality. A telling example was Bagehot’s study of Lord Bolingbroke. Here was a man ‘exceedingly defective in cool and plain judgment’ largely because his style of life, coupled with a warm nature and excitable imagination tended to make him ‘erratic not only in conduct but in judgment’.<sup>68</sup> Such flaws were evident in the nineteenth century as well. Canning was occasionally thought too excitable, and Derby was often criticised for impatience and impulsiveness. Indeed one biographer thought him similar to Bolingbroke in this regard. Certainly it was thought to have impaired his statesmanship.<sup>69</sup> To a lesser degree, Gladstone seemed sometimes to show similar failings: he too was thought ‘impulsive’ and ‘imprudent’, although this was the result of the intensity of his convictions – whatever they happened to be.<sup>70</sup> By contrast, the ideal statesman – according to Taylor – needed to acquire

calmness, order and equanimity as the necessary basis of judgment.<sup>71</sup> In particular, there needed to be the right mixture of decisiveness of reason and decisiveness of temperament. The ‘reasoning and contemplative faculty’ was obviously essential, and in the case of a complex question, the statesman needed to begin with a fairly open mind, and be able to suspend his judgment until he had got a good sense of its ‘proportions and relations’. The man incapable of deliberation tended to make erroneous decisions. But, on its own, reason tended to multiply doubts, and so a temperament suited to making decisions was needed to ‘abbreviate the operations of reason and close up the distances, thereby enabling the mind, where many things are doubtful, to seize decisively those which are least so’. So, in the early stages of a political issue, the statesman was permitted ‘patience and circumspection’ before striking with ‘energy’ towards the end.<sup>72</sup>

In broad strokes, this was the template for judging real statesmen. First, they needed to be able to access relevant knowledge. Of course, much attention was given to the education of statesmen, and – as we have seen – to the importance of mastering office. In addition, an understanding of the state of public opinion was a useful asset. While Wellington was a failure in this respect, Peel, it was thought, had a ‘quick and instinctive’ perception of the state of opinion and an unrivalled ability to tell which popular leaders mattered.<sup>73</sup> Similarly, Palmerston was credited with an understanding of the feelings of ‘England’, while Disraeli, conversely, was thought to be rather weak in assessing opinion outside Parliament. Gladstone – whether seen as a follower or leader of opinion – was at least credited with being open to fresh ideas.<sup>74</sup> Second, statesmen needed to consider a question appropriately. Peel was commended for being a practical statesman, rather than a ‘star-gazer’, who could assess every difficulty and foresee every objection.<sup>75</sup> Palmerston, also, took little interest in speculations about the future and had ‘a head cool enough to weigh cautiously and accurately even his own political projects’.<sup>76</sup> He had a ‘lucid, well-balanced, rapid grasp’ of all aspects

of a subject which enabled him to focus on the matter in hand.<sup>77</sup> Gladstone's ability to see all sides of a question was also frequently commented on, though – as W. E. Forster once said – since he could persuade himself of nearly anything this skill could also be put to perilous use. By contrast – for *The Times* at least – Lord Salisbury provided a steady hand and a clear vision as prime minister.<sup>78</sup>

When it came to acting on a decision, there appears to have been a balance between extremes. On the one hand, a measure of caution and moderation was always desirable and routinely praised. Once again, Peel was exemplary: his caution was the consequence 'not of timidity, but of prudence'; he was 'moderate by taste, his instinctive preference was always for a middle course: he disliked rashness and shrank from risk'. He was a '*tentative*' politician who always felt his way forward step-by-step.<sup>79</sup> But this virtue could be seen as a vice. Lord Aberdeen's caution meant that his nature was 'critical rather than practical, more capable of seeing what it was wrong, than of resolving what it was right to do'. While Gladstone credited him with a strong 'deliberative faculty', critics thought him 'not a good driver, and when the horses grew restive and kicked over the trace, he lacked nerve, hesitated, and was lost'.<sup>80</sup> On the other hand, statesmen were also praised for their courage. Peel showed 'boldness, tempered by sagacity', and Palmerston was commonly lauded for his 'will', 'fortitude' and 'determination'.<sup>81</sup> Disraeli's entire career had shown 'high courage', though some wondered whether this had been more for party advantage than national interest.<sup>82</sup> But courage also had its vices: Russell's widely acknowledged fearlessness meant that he was often unwilling to take advice, and became increasingly liable to lapses of judgment in the 1850s. The dangers of recklessness were all too apparent in Derby – as we have seen – and Gladstone had something of, if not 'the rashness' then 'the boldness' of the Liverpudlian.<sup>83</sup> Even Lord Salisbury was thought prone to impulsiveness until his leadership in the 1880s proved otherwise. A further danger was vacillation – politicians who lurched from one



extreme position to another. James Graham was thought as ‘unstable as water’, a man who ‘oddly blended’ both rashness and timidity in his nature.<sup>84</sup>

The final aspect of judgment worth considering is foresight. While highly desirable, it was unclear whether this was a quality which could be acquired or whether it was, ultimately, the result of good fortune. Peel, according to one critic, lacked ‘sagacious foresight’, but, conversely, a supporter argued that while he did not have a ‘prophetic mind’ that could see far into the future – as, perhaps, the elder Pitt had – he still qualified as a statesman.<sup>85</sup> Derby, by contrast, was largely lacking in prescience, while the verdict on Disraeli was mixed. Bagehot thought him prone to ‘stupendous blunders’ because of recklessness, but Reid disagreed: ‘he *does* possess in a very high degree the foresight and the accuracy of judgment which are necessary to make a man a really great statesman’. When the leading Liberal ministers were tempted to support the South in the American Civil War, he had the prescience to see that the North must win.<sup>86</sup> He was also credited him with recognising that parliamentary reform might help rather than hinder the progress of Conservatism.<sup>87</sup> In the case of Gladstone, some – such as the *Pall Mall Gazette* – diagnosed a ‘want of prescience’: he might gauge the moment accurately, but he could not succeed in ‘forecasting the future’.<sup>88</sup> In an otherwise positive account, Bryce agreed that he showed ‘less than was needed of that prescience which is, after integrity and courage, the highest gifts of a statesman’.<sup>89</sup> An accurate calculation of the consequences of any line of action was therefore a central component of effective statesmanship.

## Character and Communication

Whether that calculation was successful was often only apparent in hindsight. To know whether to trust the judgment of politicians required something else: character. This referred

both to ‘the mental and moral qualities’ of an individual as well as to ‘moral qualities strongly developed’ and was distinct from the eighteenth-century ideal of ‘politeness’ which stressed merely the outer forms of sociability.<sup>90</sup> By contrast a ‘man of character’ was supposed to demonstrate the coherence of qualities across private and public domains. Smiles’s *Character* explained the importance of will in overcoming the impulses of the lower self, and unpacked the constellation of ideals that exemplified character: duty, honesty, courage, work, energy, restraint and so on. Many of these were expected of public just as much as private individuals. Russell, for instance, spoke in 1854 of how the character of rulers ‘is a matter of utmost interest to the people of this country’. ‘It is, in fact, on the confidence reposed by people in the character of public men, that the security of this country in a great degree depends.’<sup>91</sup> There were times when this idea seemed to be under attack, especially if the exponents of statesmanlike character seemed to be using it as cover for class governance. In a discussion of Earl Grey’s life, the *Morning Chronicle* in 1845 suggested that rulers were increasingly being judged by their legislative achievements: ‘If the ends be good ... what matters it what this man is ... if he will effect some palpable utility.’ The reality, it went on, was that the character of public men lifted the character of the nation (‘patriotism is awakened, ambition purified, and the national character invigorated and ennobled’) and that this was more important than any specific financial or commercial reform.<sup>92</sup> At times it was argued that such weight should not be placed on character – do we judge the quality of military leadership by the morals of a general?<sup>93</sup> – but it was not displaced until the twentieth century. Morley’s biography of Walpole, for instance, concluded that he could not be ranked among the highest of statesmen because ‘in the world’s final estimation character goes farther than act, imagination than utility, and its leaders strike us as much by what they were as by what they did’.<sup>94</sup> Whether Morley shared ‘the world’s estimation’ is not entirely clear, but it does show that character still counted for a good deal.

Accordingly, great importance was attached to personality. As Bagehot explained, ‘political business, like all others, is not transacted by machines, but by living and breathing men, of various and generally strong characters, of various and often strong passions’.<sup>95</sup> Since it was central to the idea of ‘character’ that the lower self could be disciplined, the balance of elements in personality was crucial. Smiles insisted that temper mattered more than talent, and he outlined the ideal of an estimable man: cheerful, kind, patient, sympathetic. Such a person could cope easily with the trials life threw at him. Other characteristics needed to be guarded against. A man of strong temper, for instance, should take care to control and direct it in order to avoid ‘fitful outbreaks of passion’. Similarly, manners mattered: a rude man may be good at heart, but he would be more ‘agreeable’ and ‘probably a much more useful’ man if he adopted ‘suavity of disposition and courtesy of manner’.<sup>96</sup> These maxims applied equally to public as to private life, and political biography frequently indulged in speculations about how personal character had affected political fortune.

There were recurring criticisms applied to leading politicians. Surprisingly, a common complaint was coldness. Pitt had a touch of this, but the exemplary cases were two leading Whigs. A gentle man in private, in public Grey had a ‘cold, harsh, arrogant bearing’.<sup>97</sup> This reputation outlived the man, with later writers noting ‘stately manners ... aloof ... somewhat cold’, and summing up his character as ‘cold, reserved, and proud’.<sup>98</sup> Russell fared little better. If there was ‘Tropical warmth’ in his political beliefs, there was ‘Arctic temperature in his manners’.<sup>99</sup> He was incapable of the geniality necessary to popularity: ‘There is an icy tone in his voice and glitter in his eye’.<sup>100</sup> His ‘cold *hauteur*’ was frequently commented on, and it was argued that his pride made his relations with other politicians fraught, especially from the 1850s.<sup>101</sup> Peel was also a difficult character, marked by pride and sensitivity, and ‘impenetrable reserve’.<sup>102</sup> He rarely employed humour, and his aloofness from fellow MPs – ‘a freezing bow’ – was recorded anecdotally. One explanation was extreme shyness which he

combated with ‘an artificial manner, haughtily stiff, or exuberantly bland’.<sup>103</sup> Peel’s diffidence was not to be confused with patrician reserve, which, it was thought, hampered Salisbury’s popularity. Indeed his ‘impersonality’ led some to accuse him of lacking knowledge of other men.<sup>104</sup>

But class and character were not indivisible. Melbourne and Palmerston were both exemplars of aristocratic affability, and if in the former case ‘thorough manliness’ and ‘easy temperament’ were insufficient to rescue his reputation, in the latter they seemed integral.<sup>105</sup> Palmerston’s ‘*bonhomie*’ was crucial because ‘a good-tempered, jolly man can never be unpopular’.<sup>106</sup> Numerous commentators fixated on his geniality, humour and sociability – it was his personality which had at times enabled his government to survive when in other hands it would have fallen.<sup>107</sup> This social tact, however, did not mean he was weak statesman. While Melbourne had taken ‘the *light* treatment’ of politics too far, Palmerston got the balance right. The public saw a ‘manly and masculine hardness of grain’ that enjoyed a good fight, and stood up for friends.<sup>108</sup> Disraeli tried to pose in the same garments. He could deal with bores or avoid difficult questions ‘with one of those happy phrases or pleasant jests which Lord Palmerston loved so dearly’.<sup>109</sup> Later writers spoke of his patience, temper, cheerfulness, and above all wit.<sup>110</sup> Even the *Daily News*, which reprobated his policies, spoke warmly of his ‘indomitable courage, the unflagging energy, the marvellous tact and skill and knowledge of mankind’.<sup>111</sup> Nevertheless, the themes of class and race were never far from the surface when, perhaps more than other politicians, he was criticised for artificiality and theatricality, and for constructing a personality which appealed to the Commons, and enabled his ambition to soar.<sup>112</sup>

The fact that there were no narrow set of traits which enabled or prevented political success is evident in the case of Gladstone. In the 1850s he was judged to have a ‘delicate and fine’ mind with a ‘subtle and refining’ temperament which would make him unsuitable

for leadership.<sup>113</sup> Moreover, in comparison to Peel or Palmerston, he did not seem 'safe': he had a 'fluctuating' temperament which could be 'hot and hasty' but also sometimes 'indecisive'.<sup>114</sup> In opposition he was prone to take the controversial side of a question thereby revealing an 'enthusiastic' and 'impulsive' character. His supporters lived in fear of where his 'eccentricity' might take them: his overbearing – even arrogant – style rarely condescended to explain to his rank and file.<sup>115</sup> Indeed, he knew little about how to conciliate, and so was a failure in managing individuals. The fact that he seemed largely incapable of humour and adopted a solemn tone only seemed to make this worse. Even amid all the panegyrics in 1898, it was felt that he had struggled to contain a hot temper to the point that he could easily be goaded by his opponents.<sup>116</sup> Given the centrality of the idea of Disraeli as 'alien', it is striking that Gladstone – for all his oratorical brilliance and administrative achievement – could also be seen as uncomfortably strange. Certainly a number of writers thought his 'serious failings' of temperament and character were indicative of a lack of the manliness required of politicians.<sup>117</sup>

The final quality required of statesmen was the ability to persuade the audiences that mattered. This was largely understood in terms of oratory.<sup>118</sup> James Mackintosh explained that as the power of public opinion grew so the 'faculty of persuading men to support or oppose political measures' became central, and so excellent debating skills were actually a rather good test of political ability.<sup>119</sup> Macaulay, similarly, argued that while early modern politicians oriented themselves to the court, since the Restoration the talent for speaking had developed: 'It has stood in the place of all other acquirements. It has covered ignorance, weakness, rashness, the most fatal maladministration.'<sup>120</sup> To develop the discussion further, three themes may be stressed. First, the nature and success of particular styles of speaking; second, the implications of emerging audiences; and third, controversy about the effects of oratory.

Oratory was typically evaluated – especially in the first half of the century – according to classical models. An exemplary speaker might be praised for his command of language, the use of ‘ornament’, and the arrangement of the argument. Considerable attention was paid to the manner of delivery: it should be graceful, easy, ‘unaffected and unforced’, and the speaker should be in control of his ‘action, gesture, expression and elocution’.<sup>121</sup> Certain styles once favoured – for instance the ‘theatrical effect’ of the elder Pitt – were thought to be old-fashioned by the 1830s.<sup>122</sup> Similarly, Disraeli’s maiden speech was drowned out in laughter because its ‘exaggerated attitude and diction’ seemed to be idiosyncratic.<sup>123</sup> What really mattered, however, was that a speaker was persuasive. For this reason, prepared speeches would not get one far. They might demonstrate the powers of reason and imagination, but not a talent for political leadership.<sup>124</sup> Macaulay himself, according to the *Morning Chronicle*, was all ‘simulated fervour and laboured spontaneity’ which looked hollow compared to Peel’s style.<sup>125</sup> A much better ideal was Gladstone who, according to Bryce, could speak effectively with very limited notice, and was also able – unlike even excellent orators such as Pitt and Fox – both to open and close a debate.

Significant attention was given to the emotional power of a speech. Pitt ‘transported’ his audience, and Fox could sway and enthuse them.<sup>126</sup> In an early essay on Gladstone, Bagehot accepted that he was a fine speaker with superb command of language, but, he asked, ‘Did the audience feel? were they excited? did they cheer?’<sup>127</sup> By the time of his death no one doubted the answers to these questions, and the almost ‘magical’ quality of his effects on audiences was widely noted. It was frequently argued that the root of Gladstone’s appeal was the power and depth of his earnestness, and indeed this was an important quality for a speaker.<sup>128</sup> Canning, for example, made very effective use of wit, but his lightness and fancy sometimes became ‘too exuberant’ and the audience assumed he was not being earnest.<sup>129</sup> Disraeli’s success as a speaker was also achieved at some cost to his reputation as an orator.

He was certainly skilful, and knew how to perform a variety of roles – defiant, surprising, savage – and even though one could tell it *was* a performance, it nevertheless often worked on his parliamentary audience.<sup>130</sup> He could charm them, and his use of humour, and especially sarcasm, was thought a crucial ingredient of his success. But, as *The Times* argued, ‘If earnestness is the soul of oratory, it would be strange indeed if we could bestow higher praise than brilliancy on most of the speeches of Mr Disraeli’.<sup>131</sup> Bryce developed the point, arguing that his failure in the true index of eloquence – ‘the power of touching the emotions’ – was evident in that while he could make men laugh, he could not make them cry.<sup>132</sup>

Less accomplished speakers could still prove effective. Melbourne, for example, was the target of considerable abuse – even on his death – for his indistinct, halting, and stumbling delivery. Yet his defenders turned this to his advantage – he was not capable of ‘sustained flights of eloquence’ because he disliked rhetoric and exaggeration. Instead he was commended for simplicity and truthfulness which spoke directly and powerfully to an audience. ‘To gain a political character, it is not always necessary to be speech-making’ – such arguments drew, as we shall see, on enduring suspicions about the dangers of oratorical display.<sup>133</sup> Perhaps the best instance of a comparatively poor speaker who excelled as a politician was Palmerston. He was not ‘graceful’ and to the end of his life there was ‘hesitancy’ while he searched for the right word.<sup>134</sup> He had never ‘scaled the heights of oratory’; there was no ‘dazzling light’ – he was ‘skilful at fence’ but no more.<sup>135</sup> Sometimes he offended because of excessive vulgarity, but in general he was clever enough rarely to open himself to dangerous positions, and he employed ridicule and diversion effectively. He could make the House laugh and cheer and when necessary adopt a ‘sham enthusiasm’ that gave the impression of conviction. He was a partisan, a debater who could manage the House, but never aspired – when ‘appealing to the passions or developing the policy of the hour’ – to be an orator who could transcend the practicality of the moment.<sup>136</sup>

By mid-century it was widely agreed that the style of oratory had evolved to suit the needs of the age. In an essay on Gladstone, Ritchie noted the comparative absence of wit, and suggested that ‘oratorical display’ was less sought after in the Commons. That era had culminated in Canning, but was now over: the Commons had become ‘a business assembly’.<sup>137</sup> The lodestone for this argument was Peel. In 1845 G. H. Francis argued that the traditional purposes of oratory – to excite passions, to sway judgment, to delight mankind – were being supplanted because since 1832 the Commons had become more ‘business-like’, and so powerful speakers attended more to ‘immediate utility’ than to lasting beauty. Peel was adept at this, and hence will be classed ‘among the statesmen than among the orators’. This type of leader had to be ready with facts and figures, able to understand all shades of opinion, and capable of explaining himself clearly, or concealing himself effectively, as appropriate. The speeches of Peel were typified by ‘common sense’ rather than being marked for ‘vivid imagination or profound thought’.<sup>138</sup> Obituarists agreed that Peel’s speeches were ‘like himself, practical’ and that their eloquence ‘consisted in their persuasiveness’.<sup>139</sup> Bagehot developed these points into a central argument. In an age of business there was no need to awaken deep passions, and so Peel’s oratory was perfect for the time because he aimed to explain rather than to charm or amuse. Ironically he was better suited to the reformed Commons – a style more appropriate to its unreformed incarnation was Canning’s ‘easy fluency ... nice wit ... passing from topic to topic, like the raconteur of the dinner table’.<sup>140</sup> The idea that Peel represented a transition was repeatedly affirmed by later writers. Justin McCarthy saw in him the passing away of the eloquence of Pitt and Fox, and that from thereon any speaker needed ‘a good deal of business-precision and practicality’.<sup>141</sup> In this respect Gladstone managed to combine the command and elevation of an orator, with the mastery of detail needed for a business age.



The second point about oratory is related: discussion of the opportunities and effects of new audiences. As Macaulay argued, at the time of the elder Pitt the fame of a speaker depended entirely on those who heard him in Parliament and so his style and manner were crucial. Since then the reporting of speeches gave the politician two separate audiences. The one in Parliament might be ‘pleased or disgusted’ by his voice and action, but over the breakfast table shrill tones and uncouth gestures became irrelevant.<sup>142</sup> A successful politician in the 1830s and 40s tried to transcend this division. Within a generation, the problem became more marked as politicians took to the platform. Bagehot, in a review of Gladstone’s speech at Greenwich in 1871, argued that it inaugurated an era when one of the prime minister’s ‘most important qualifications’ would be ‘to exert a direct control over the masses’. A statesman who could do this would have a ‘vast’ advantage, and while parliamentarians might be uneasy about these trends, they would soon understand the need to become popular orators and to deal in ‘the broad, easy, and animated style’ which touches the people rather than the ‘subtle flavours’ of parliamentary oratory.<sup>143</sup> Gladstone became the master of ‘this branch of rhetoric’, and few others were judged to be nearly as successful.<sup>144</sup> Disraeli’s influence was restricted to Parliament, and he actively disliked speaking to large audiences.<sup>145</sup> Salisbury, similarly, was thought to be less effective outdoors. He had a strong aversion to the ‘arts of the demagogue’ and was not one to ‘conjure’ with the country.<sup>146</sup> His speeches were ‘models of polished irony and effective declamation’, but they excited no enthusiasm from wide audiences.<sup>147</sup> Yet, as Bryce noted in an essay on Northcote, it was the ‘power of moving crowds’ that the younger generation of politicians seemed especially to value.<sup>148</sup>

The third theme was both old and new, as the rise of the platform gave a more pronounced edge to some traditional criticisms of the art of oratory. Three connected points should be highlighted. First was the concern – especially among the high-minded – that the

stress on public speaking in an adversarial system tended to undermine interest in and pursuit of the truth. Bagehot frequently articulated this anxiety, and cited Macaulay's argument that popular government encouraged eager young minds to mount arguments that no man of sense would ever make.<sup>149</sup> The net effect over time was to debase the reasoning faculties. The art of debating was very quickly separated from the capacity for belief, and this pressure was merely exacerbated by the widespread expectation that cabinet ministers had a 'ready, producible, defensible view of all great questions'.<sup>150</sup> A second anxiety was whether oratory actually undermined the conditions of statesmanship. Since politicians were trained to excel in speechifying and debating, they could sometimes be constitutionally unfit to manage a department and lead the nation. Carlyle, as we have seen, expressed these doubts in extreme form, but Greg in the 1850s could also be found wondering whether 'the talking and acting faculties' were really compatible.<sup>151</sup> The third theme was nicely expressed by Bryce: if Parliament was 'not a good place' for the pursuit of truth, 'the platform is still less favourable to that quest'.<sup>152</sup> This was the old problem of demagoguery. An ambitious man might use 'mean arts and unreasonable clamours' – the phrase was Macaulay's<sup>153</sup> – to rouse popular passions for his own factious ends. In the first half of the century Henry Hunt, O'Connell, and Bright were frequently painted in this light. They were routinely called demagogues and their style of speaking contrasted with the parliamentary art required of a true statesman. With the rise of the platform, however, the two realms blended, and it became easier to accuse established politicians of succumbing to demagoguery. Opponents of Gladstone found this a compelling line of argument. One such pamphleteer went so far as to argue that 'first-class oratory is only a theatrical entertainment' and that 'really great statesmen' were generally merely good speakers rather than exemplary orators.<sup>154</sup> By the end of the century, then, oratory was still assumed to be an essential ingredient of leadership, but it now also

attracted anxiety – a statesman could not avoid speaking to the people, but he had to take care how he went about it.

In 'British Statesmanship in 1905' F. W. Raffety argued that the recent death of Harcourt marked a 'severance' in parliamentary tradition: 'with him departed nearly the last of a school of statesmanship which seems to be passing away before there is discovered any clear evidence of one that is to take its place'. Certainly, Edwardian leaders were of a much younger generation than the Victorian titans they had so recently replaced. Still, one does not need to share Raffety's partisan criticisms of Conservative failings to recognise that the terms he used were very familiar. He criticised the government for a lack of settled convictions and administrative ability. There was little sign of earnestness: expediency and opportunism ruled the roost. Some might argue for an infusion of business skills, but this missed the point – there ought to be 'an elevation of thought and object' that lifted the statesman above the level of the merchant. A particular anxiety – increasingly common in the Edwardian era – has been a central theme of this chapter. 'It is not assiduity in public service', demonstrated by 'long observation and study of public affairs or acquaintance with the history and constitution of the country', that was rewarded, but personal popularity. This, Raffety lamented, was often achieved through, among other things, exploiting sporting connections. Bryce, as we have seen, thought the voting nation was tested and proven by the leaders it chose. Raffety feared that at present the 'character and pretensions' of parliamentary aspirants were unlikely to change until 'the electors recognise that they require and must have a class of men ... quite different to the president of a football club'.<sup>155</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> J. Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, 2 vols (New York, 1921), II, pp. 542, 550.

<sup>2</sup> P. Anderson, 'Origins of the Present Crisis', *New Left Review* 23 (1964), 19-45.

<sup>3</sup> D. M. Craig, "'High Politics' and the 'New Political History'", *Historical Journal* 53 (2010), 453-75.

<sup>4</sup> e.g. J. Parry, *The Politics of Patriotism: English Liberalism, National Identity and Europe, 1830-1886* (Cambridge, 2006); P. Joyce, *Democratic Subjects: the Self and the Social in Nineteenth-Century England* (Cambridge, 1994); M. McCormack, ed., *Public Men: Masculinity and Politics in Modern Britain* (Basingstoke, 2007).

<sup>5</sup> A little-known exception is J.H. Grainger, *Character and Style in English Politics* (Cambridge, 1969).

<sup>6</sup> Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, II, p. 551.

<sup>7</sup> Based on an electronic search of *The Times*.

<sup>8</sup> H. Taylor, *The Statesman* (London, 1836), p. vi.

<sup>9</sup> *The Examiner*, 29 May 1836.

<sup>10</sup> e.g. *Edinburgh Review* 64 (1836), p. 215.

<sup>11</sup> *Fraser's Magazine* 14 (1836), p. 393.

<sup>12</sup> T. Carlyle, *On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History* (London, 1841), pp. 316, 317.

<sup>13</sup> B. Disraeli, *Coningsby* (London, 1881), pp. 117-21; R. Shannon, *Gladstone 1809-1865* (London, 1982), p. 127. See also J. Parry, 'Disraeli and England', *Historical Journal* 43 (2000), 699-728.

<sup>14</sup> T. Carlyle, *Latter-Day Pamphlets: Downing Street* (London, 1850), pp. 28, 30.

<sup>15</sup> *The Collected Works of Walter Bagehot*, ed. N. St John Stevas, 15 vols (London, 1965-86) [hereafter CWB], VI, p. 86.

- 
- <sup>16</sup> CWB, VI, pp. 83, 86.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid., pp. 88-9.
- <sup>18</sup> J. R. Seeley, *The Life and Adventures of E.M. Anrdt* (London, 1879), p. v.
- <sup>19</sup> CWB, III, p. 415.
- <sup>20</sup> See the sophisticated analysis of Russell's reputation in J. P. Parry, 'Past and Future in the Later Career of Lord John Russell' in T. Blanning and D. Cannadine, eds, *History and Biography: Essays in Honour of Derek Beales* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 142-72.
- <sup>21</sup> *The Times*, 25 November 1848, 15 December 1860.
- <sup>22</sup> *Standard*, 28 March 1889; *Economist*, 30 March 1889.
- <sup>23</sup> CWB, VI, p. 151; III, p. 504.
- <sup>24</sup> J. A. Froude, *Lord Beaconsfield* (London, 1890), p. 260.
- <sup>25</sup> e.g. *Westminster Review* 5 (1837), pp. 1-31.
- <sup>26</sup> See O. Anderson, *A Liberal State at War: English Politics and Economics during the Crimean War* (London, 1967).
- <sup>27</sup> *Westminster Review* 5 (1837), p. 8.
- <sup>28</sup> CWB, III, p. 248.
- <sup>29</sup> Taylor, *Statesman*, p. 9.
- <sup>30</sup> *Westminster Review* 5 (1837), pp. 8-9.
- <sup>31</sup> Taylor, *Statesman*, pp. 160, 161.
- <sup>32</sup> W. R. Greg, *Essays on Political and Social Science*, 2 vols (London, 1853), II, pp. 394, 396.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid., pp. 323, 327.
- <sup>34</sup> CWB, III, p. 251.
- <sup>35</sup> Lord Clarendon cited in Anderson, *Liberal State*, p. 35; *Daily News*; CWB, III, p. 276.

---

<sup>36</sup> CWB, VI, pp. 209, 140, 92.

<sup>37</sup> e.g. T. W. Reid, *Cabinet Portraits. Sketches of Statesmen* (London, 1872), p. 23.

<sup>38</sup> *The Times*, 20 May 1898.

<sup>39</sup> CWB, III, pp. 469, 418.

<sup>40</sup> J. Bryce, *Studies in Contemporary Biography* (London, 1903), p. 411. See also G.W.E. Russell, *The Right Honourable W. E. Gladstone* (London, 1891), p. 272.

<sup>41</sup> *The Times*, 24 August 1903.

<sup>42</sup> e.g. T. Macaulay, *Critical and Historical Essays*, 2 vols (London, 1907), I, pp. 197-200.

<sup>43</sup> See D. Runciman, *Political Hypocrisy: the Mask of Power, from Hobbes to Orwell and Beyond* (Princeton, 2008).

<sup>44</sup> Macaulay, *Essays*, I, p. 201.

<sup>45</sup> S. Smiles, *Character* (London, 1876), pp. 6, 137, 207.

<sup>46</sup> *The Times*, *Morning Chronicle*, 21 July 1845.

<sup>47</sup> *The Times*, 29 May 1878.

<sup>48</sup> *The Times*, 19 October 1865; see also *Daily News* which explained that Palmerston carried the ‘sneer’ of the eighteenth century into the nineteenth.

<sup>49</sup> Greg, *Essays*, II, p. 374; CWB, III, p. 486.

<sup>50</sup> Runciman, *Political Hypocrisy*, p. 148. See D. M. Craig, ‘Advanced Conservative Liberalism: Party and Principle in Trollope’s Parliamentary Novels’, *Victorian Literature and Culture* 38 (2010), 355-71.

<sup>51</sup> J. Symons, *Sir Robert Peel as a type of Statesmanship* (London, 1856), p. 189, and *passim*.

<sup>52</sup> Greg, *Essays*, II, p. 323.

<sup>53</sup> D. O. Maddyn, *Chiefs of Parties, Past and Present*, 2 vols (London, 1856), II, pp. 34-5.

<sup>54</sup> *The Times*, 4 July 1850; see also *Morning Chronicle*, 3 July 1850.

- 
- <sup>55</sup> *A Chapter of Autobiography* (1868); *The Irish Question* (1886).
- <sup>56</sup> Maddyn, *Chiefs*, II, p. 259.
- <sup>57</sup> CWB, III, pp. 426-33. See also J. Ewing Ritchie, *Modern Statesmen, or Sketches from the Strangers' Gallery of the House of Commons* (London, 1861), pp. 76-8.
- <sup>58</sup> *Daily News*, 20 May 1898.
- <sup>59</sup> Bryce, *Studies*, pp. 416-17.
- <sup>60</sup> Ritchie, *Modern Statesmen*, p. 65; see also Greg, *Essays*, II, p. 332.
- <sup>61</sup> See D. Craig, 'Burke and the Constitution' in D. Dwan and C. Insole, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Edmund Burke* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 113-15.
- <sup>62</sup> Taylor, *Statesman*, pp. 112-13.
- <sup>63</sup> CWB, III, pp. 255, 258, 260.
- <sup>64</sup> Greg, *Essays*, II, p. 334.
- <sup>65</sup> Taylor, *Statesman*, pp. 109, 112, 119.
- <sup>66</sup> *Blackwood's* 40 (1836), pp. 218-27; *Westminster Review* 5 (1837), pp. 22-6.
- <sup>67</sup> *Fortnightly Review* 3 (1865), pp. 323, 324, 326.
- <sup>68</sup> CWB, III, p. 68.
- <sup>69</sup> G. Saintsbury, *The Earl of Derby* (London, 1906), pp. 202, 210-12. See *The Times*, *Morning Post*, *Pall Mall Gazette*, 25 October 1869.
- <sup>70</sup> Reid, *Cabinet Portraits*, p. 18.
- <sup>71</sup> Taylor, *Statesman*, pp. 76-81.
- <sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 141-3.
- <sup>73</sup> Greg, *Essays*, II, pp. 325, 327.
- <sup>74</sup> Bryce, *Studies*, pp. 413, 417.
- <sup>75</sup> J. McCarthy, *Sir Robert Peel* (London, 1891), p. 51; Greg, *Essays*, II, p. 327.

- 
- <sup>76</sup> *Pall Mall Gazette*, 19 October 1865.
- <sup>77</sup> J.D.S.C. Lorne, *Viscount Palmerston* (London, 1906), p. 234.
- <sup>78</sup> *The Times*, 20 May 1898 and 24 August 1903.
- <sup>79</sup> *Morning Chronicle*, 3 July 1850; Greg, *Essays*, II, pp. 323, 355.
- <sup>80</sup> *The Times*, 15 December 1860; Gladstone cited in A. Stanmore, *The Earl of Aberdeen* (London, 1905), p. 308; Stuart J. Reid, *Lord John Russell* (London, 1895), p. 209.
- <sup>81</sup> CWB, III, p. 277; *Morning Post*, 19 October 1865; Lorne, *Palmerston*, p. 234.
- <sup>82</sup> *The Times*, 20 April 1881.
- <sup>83</sup> CWB, III, p. 419.
- <sup>84</sup> Maddyn, *Chiefs*, II, p. 256; Reid, *Russell*, p. 232.
- <sup>85</sup> Symons, *Peel*, p. 70; Greg, *Essays*, II, p. 358.
- <sup>86</sup> CWB, III, p. 492; Reid, *Cabinet Portraits*, p. 12.
- <sup>87</sup> Bryce, *Studies*, p. 57.
- <sup>88</sup> *Pall Mall Gazette*, 19 May 1898.
- <sup>89</sup> Bryce, *Studies*, p. 416.
- <sup>90</sup> S. Collini, *Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain 1850-1930* (Oxford, 1991), p. 96.
- <sup>91</sup> Russell, *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates* CXXXI 305, 3 March 1854. See Ritchie, *Modern Statesmen*, p. 34 for the criticism that 'character' could mean just about anything.
- <sup>92</sup> *Morning Chronicle*, 21 July 1845.
- <sup>93</sup> *Fortnightly Review* 3 (1865), p. 322.
- <sup>94</sup> J. Morley, *Walpole* (London, 1889), p. 114.
- <sup>95</sup> CWB, VI, p. 56.
- <sup>96</sup> Smiles, *Character*, pp. 165, 236, 238.



- 
- <sup>97</sup> *The Times*, 21 July 1845.
- <sup>98</sup> Reid, *Russell*, p. 65; H. Dunckley, *Lord Melbourne* (London, 1906), p. 166.
- <sup>99</sup> Maddyn, *Chiefs*, II, p. 214.
- <sup>100</sup> Ritchie, *Modern Statesmen*, p. 20.
- <sup>101</sup> Reid, *Cabinet Portraits*, p. 117.
- <sup>102</sup> *The Times*, 4 July 1850.
- <sup>103</sup> Maddyn, *Chiefs*, II, pp. 50, 48. See also McCarthy, *Peel*, pp. 2-4, 37.
- <sup>104</sup> *The Times*, 24 August 1903.
- <sup>105</sup> Dunckley, *Melbourne*, pp. 124, 152.
- <sup>106</sup> Ritchie, *Modern Statesmen*, p. 8.
- <sup>107</sup> See *The Times*, 19 October 1865.
- <sup>108</sup> *Pall Mall Gazette*, 19 October 1865.
- <sup>109</sup> Reid, *Cabinet Portraits*, p. 8.
- <sup>110</sup> e.g. F. Hitchman, *The Public Life of the Right Honourable the Earl of Beaconsfield* 2 vols (London, 1879), pp. ix-x; *Morning Post*, 20 April 1881.
- <sup>111</sup> *Daily News*, 20 April 1881.
- <sup>112</sup> See e.g. Bryce, *Studies*, pp. 21-6.
- <sup>113</sup> Greg, *Essays*, II, p. 371.
- <sup>114</sup> Maddyn, *Chiefs*, II, pp. 267, 270.
- <sup>115</sup> Ritchie, *Modern Statesmen*, p. 79; Reid, *Cabinet Portraits*, pp. 18, 19.
- <sup>116</sup> See Reid, *Cabinet Portraits*, p. 21; Russell, *Gladstone*, pp. 228-9; *Standard*, *Pall Mall Gazette*, 19 May 1898; *Daily News*, 20 May 1898; Bryce, *Studies*, pp. 420-2, 461.
- <sup>117</sup> Reid, *Cabinet Portraits*, p. 27.

- 
- <sup>118</sup> See J. Meisel, *Public Speech and the Culture of Public Life in the Age of Gladstone* (New York, 2001).
- <sup>119</sup> J. Mackintosh, *Miscellaneous Works* (New York, 1871), p. 240.
- <sup>120</sup> Macaulay, *Essays*, I, p 243.
- <sup>121</sup> *Fraser's Magazine* 10 (1874), p. 513; J. Mill, *Disraeli, the Author, Orator, and Statesman* (London, 1863), p. 240.
- <sup>122</sup> Macaulay, *Essays*, I, p. 378.
- <sup>123</sup> Ritchie, *Modern Statesmen*, p. 57.
- <sup>124</sup> Mackintosh, *Works*, p. 240.
- <sup>125</sup> *Morning Chronicle*, 3 July 1850.
- <sup>126</sup> *Gentleman's Magazine* (February 1806), p. 129.
- <sup>127</sup> CWB, III, p. 419.
- <sup>128</sup> *Standard*, 19 May 1898; *The Times*, 20 May 1898.
- <sup>129</sup> Mackintosh, *Works*, p. 241.
- <sup>130</sup> See Reid, *Cabinet Portraits*, pp. 7-10; Ritchie, *Modern Statesmen*, pp. 60-4; CWB, III, p. 503.
- <sup>131</sup> *The Times*, 20 April 1881.
- <sup>132</sup> Bryce, *Studies*, p. 46.
- <sup>133</sup> *Morning Chronicle*, 27 November 1848.
- <sup>134</sup> *Standard*, 19 October 1865.
- <sup>135</sup> Ritchie, *Modern Statesmen*, pp. 9-10.
- <sup>136</sup> G. H. Francis, *Orators of the Age* (New York, 1847), pp. 104, 106.
- <sup>137</sup> Ritchie, *Modern Statesmen*, p. 71.
- <sup>138</sup> Francis, *Orators*, pp. 30-1, 35-6.

- 
- <sup>139</sup> *Morning Chronicle*, 3 July 1850.
- <sup>140</sup> CWB, III, p. 268.
- <sup>141</sup> McCarthy, *Peel*, p. 11.
- <sup>142</sup> Macaulay, *Essays*, I, p. 377.
- <sup>143</sup> CWB, III, pp. 461, 462.
- <sup>144</sup> *Standard*, 19 May 1898.
- <sup>145</sup> CWB, III, p. 504; Bryce, *Studies*, p. 47.
- <sup>146</sup> H. D. Traill, *The Marquis of Salisbury* (London, 1891), p. 216; *Illustrated London News*, 29 August 1903.
- <sup>147</sup> *Statesmen Past and Future* (London, 1894), p. 10.
- <sup>148</sup> Bryce, *Studies*, p. 226.
- <sup>149</sup> CWB, III, pp. 257-8.
- <sup>150</sup> CWB, VI, p. 94.
- <sup>151</sup> Greg, p. 394.
- <sup>152</sup> Bryce, *Studies*, p. 214.
- <sup>153</sup> T. Macaulay, *The History of England*, 4 vols (London, 1906), I, p. 183
- <sup>154</sup> H. Strickland Constable, *On Certain Hindrances to Wisdom in Statesmanship* (London, 1887), p. 8.
- <sup>155</sup> *Westminster Review* 163 (1905), pp. 496, 499.